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THE OBSTACLE: A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIVERSAL 
STANDARD TO DETERMINE THOSE ACTS OR 
EVENTS THAT SUFFICIENTLY RISE TO THE LEVEL 
OF AN OBSTACLE SUSPENDING PRESCRIPTION 
OF NON-USE FOR A MINERAL SERVITUDE OWNER 





Like all great Louisiana tales, this one begins with our friends, 
Boudreaux & Thibodeaux.
1
 Boudreaux purchased Blackacre from 
Thibodeaux on January 1, 2009. Thibodeaux expressly reserved the right to 
explore for oil & gas by a mineral servitude within the Act of Sale. 
Unfortunately, Thibodeaux is quite lazy, preferring to do anything but 
explore the land for minerals. Thibodeaux continued to ignore his mineral 
right on Blackacre for nearly the next 10 years. It is only on December 26, 
2018, that Thibodeaux receives news that a nearby land, Whiteacre, has 
started producing paying quantities of oil. His wife, Clotile, informed him 
                                                                                                             
  LL.M Candidate 2021, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D. 
2020, Paul M. Hebert Law Center. The author would like to thank his parents, brother and 
partner—Tom, Mary, Thomas and Kira—for their unconditional love and support. They are 
truly the pistons driving this engine. The author would also like to thank Professors Keith 
Hall and Edward Richards for their insights and assistance while researching and writing this 
Comment.  
 1. Boudreaux and Thibodeaux are two characters from South Louisiana experiencing 
life's trials and tribulations. It is common in South Louisiana to see these characters arise in 
oral stories passed down from one generation to another and the author has benefitted from 
the humorous life events presiding within these fables. 
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that they have bills to pay, so Thibodeaux decided to begin the process of 
drilling on his land. On December 29, 2018, Thibodeaux’s hired contractor 
began drilling operations, but the equipment failed and the operations could 
not proceed. Later that evening, a massive storm swept over the area 
containing Blackacre, causing unforeseeable inundation of the land. 
Consequently, all equipment and personnel had to be evacuated and no 
successful drilling occurred. On January 2
, 
2019, the residual water finally 
drained from the land, and drilling activities commenced. On January 3, 
2019, drilling was conducted to the depth where paying quantities are 
located. Thibodeaux became a millionaire overnight . . . or did he? 
Meanwhile, Boudreaux claimed that Thibodeaux improperly trespassed 
upon Blackacre because the right to the minerals had reverted to Boudreaux 
on January 1, 2019. Thibodeaux contested Boudreaux’s claim, arguing that 
the flooding constituted an obstacle that suspended the tolling of 
prescription of nonuse, and correspondingly, he was within his rights to 
explore the minerals on Blackacre.  
Louisiana courts have discussed the law regarding obstacles in several 
cases but failed to give a precise standard to define an obstacle—rather, the 
jurisprudence has defined what is not an obstacle, as opposed to what is.
2
 
Most of the cases involve mere legal restrictions, as opposed to physical 
restrictions that would materially obstruct an individual or entity from the 
use of a mineral servitude. In recent years, flooding concerns have vastly 
increased, notably the 2016 Baton Rouge Flood and the 2017 Hurricane 
Harvey flooding in Houston. Considering these growing concerns, it is now 
increasingly important to discuss and determine whether a catastrophic 
flood, causing inundation of prescriptable land, can establish a sufficient 
obstacle to use of the servitude such that the running of prescription of 
nonuse warrants suspension.  
Part I will lay a background of the law regarding mineral servitudes in 
Louisiana, including a discussion of the provisions for prescription of 
nonuse, as well as the legal mechanisms that stop the tolling of 
prescription.
3 
Part II will provide an examination of the Louisiana 
jurisprudence discussing the suspension of prescription as a result of an 
obstacle.
4
 Part III will propose a universal standard to assist mineral 
servitude owners in exploring the question of whether particular acts or 
events are sufficient to rise to the level of an obstacle suspending 
                                                                                                             
 2. See Comment to La. R.S § 31:59. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
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 Finally, Part IV will propose that under the 
standard elucidated, extensive flooding is an obstacle under Louisiana 
Mineral Code Article 59 (hereinafter “Article 59”)—and illustrate the 




I. Background  
The prominent Roman glossator Accursius once proclaimed cuius est 
solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, “usually translated as 
meaning that the rights of the surface owner extend upward to the heavens 
(ad coelum) and downward to the center of the earth (ad inferos)."
7
 
However, modifying the traditional ad coelum doctrine, Louisiana mineral 
law expressly restricts a person from owning “oil, gas and other minerals 
occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form . . . .”
8
 While Louisiana 
maintained the ownership-in-place theory for solid minerals, it established 
the non-ownership or servitude theory over fugacious minerals. True 
ownership of fugitive minerals, such as oil and gas, only occurs once the 
minerals are reduced to possession.
9
 In the seminal case of Frost-Johnson 
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down 
a decision viewed by many as “the single most important decision ever 
rendered by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the area of mineral law,”
10
 
holding that fugacious minerals were insusceptible of ownership before 
being reduced to possession. Instead, a transfer of the “ownership” of 
fugitive minerals from the landowner to another was a transfer of the right 
to explore and reduce to possession—a servitude.
11
 This landmark decision 




                                                                                                             
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. See infra Part V. 
 7. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 980–
81 (2008); Id. at note 14 (“ [Edward] Coke [in The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of 
England] apparently borrowed this phrase from civil law scholars, where it can be traced 
back to Accursius, a glossator whose commentaries on Roman law were written in the 
thirteenth century.”). 
 8. La. R.S. 31:6 (2000). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Patrick S. Ottinger, A Primer on the Mineral Servitude, 47th Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 
68 (1997). 
 11. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co v. Salling’s Heirs, 150 La. 756, 863 (La. 1920). 
 12. Id. 
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Louisiana differs from other states in that it “does not recognize a 
separate mineral estate in oil and gas.”
13
 This rule was first dictated by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court and subsequently codified in the Louisiana 
Mineral Code.
14
 The Louisiana Mineral Code defines a mineral servitude as 
a right “belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing 
minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.”
15
 This paper will 
not set forth an exhaustive discussion of Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, as 
notable scholars have previously done.
16
 
The mineral servitude comes with significant legal consequences if 
unused. Most notably, a mineral servitude is extinguished by nonuse if it is 
not used for a period of ten years.
17
 Unlike a mineral servitude, a common 
law mineral estate will generally not escheat to the landowner if not used 
within a certain time, absent an intent to abandon or the enactment of a 
state-specific Dormant Mineral Act.
18
 Whether a mineral servitude has 
prescribed by nonuse is a major area of litigation under Louisiana mineral 
rights.
19
 The law provides certain relief to the running of prescription of 
nonuse on a mineral servitude: suspension and interruption.
20
 
                                                                                                             
 13. In the vast majority of common law states, there has been limited abrogation of ad 
coelum doctrine, so that the owner of the land retains the ownership of the minerals within 
the land and is capable of creating a separate mineral estate that is an independent article of 
commerce; see Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 
1097, 1098 (1987). 
 14. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co, 150 La. at 863 (La. 1920); see also La. R.S. 31:21 
(2000). 
 15. La. R.S. 31:21 (2000). 
 16. See generally Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. 
REV. 1097 (1987); see also Patrick S. Ottinger, A Primer on the Mineral Servitude, 47th 
Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 68 (1997). 
 17. La. Civ. Code arts. 789, 3546; see e.g., Frost-Johnson Lumber Company, 150 La. at 
864. 
 18. For an illustration of a common law state terminating a separate mineral estate under 
the doctrine of abandonment, see e.g., Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 876-877 (1968); 
For an example of an enacted Dormant Mineral Act, see e.g., Ohio Dormant Mineral Act, 
Ohio Rev. Code § 5301.56(B)(1)(c) and (B)(2) (1989). 
 19. Patrick H. Martin, Mineral Rights, 43 LA. L. REV. 523, 531 (1982). 
 20. See La. R.S. 31:29 (2000) (“The prescription of nonuse running against a mineral 
servitude is interrupted by good faith operations for the discovery and production of 
minerals. By good faith is meant that the operations must be (1) commenced with reasonable 
expectation of discovering and producing minerals in paying quantities at a particular point 
or depth, (2) continued at the site chosen to that point or depth, and (3) conducted in such a 
manner that they constitute a single operation although actual drilling or mining is not 
conducted at all times.”); see also La. R.S. 31:59 (“If the owner of a mineral servitude is 
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Generally speaking, the Louisiana Civil Code states that “if the owner of 
the dominant estate is prevented from using the servitude by an obstacle 
that he can neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonuse is 
suspended on that account for a period of up to ten years.”
21
 Feeding off of 
the Civil Code provision, the Louisiana Mineral Code specifically deals 
with mineral servitudes, providing that prescription of nonuse is suspended 
when there is an obstacle that prevents the owner of a mineral servitude 
from use.
22
 The problem with the statutory provisions and the jurisprudence 
is that while these sources give us the rule for suspension of prescription of 
nonuse resulting from an obstacle preventing the use of the mineral 
servitude, they fail to provide useful concrete standards to determine acts or 
events that are potentially an obstacle.
23
  
An “obstacle,” defined in laymen’s terms, is “something that impedes 
progress or achievement.”
24
 To impede, an act or event must “interfere with 
or slow the progress of” the object at issue.
25
 Thus, an obstacle, put plainly, 
is something that interferes with or slows the progress of the mineral 
servitude owner from using his or her servitude.
26
 The authors of the 
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise for Predial Servitudes state that “[a]n obstacle 
may be legal, such as an injunction, or it may be material, such as a 
temporary inundation of the servient estate.”
27
 Besides that, not much 
guidance exists on this seemingly trivial concept that can have far-reaching 
ramifications.  
  
                                                                                                             
prevented from using it by an obstacle that he can neither prevent nor remove, the 
prescription of nonuse does not run as long as the obstacle remains.”).  
 21. La. Civ. Code art. 755 (2010). 
 22. La. R.S. 31:59 (2000). 
 23. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 
1159 (1987).  
 24. Obstacle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/obstacle (last visited Dec. 11, 2019). 
 25. Impede, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/impede (last visited Dec. 11, 2019). 
 26. See Obstacle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/obstacle (last visited Dec. 11, 2019); See also Impede, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/impede (last visited Dec. 11, 2019); La. R.S. 31:59 (2000).  
 27. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 8:6, in 4 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (West 4th ed. 2004). 
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II. Louisiana Jurisprudence on Obstacles  
The courts have interpreted this simple provision in the Louisiana 
Mineral Code, addressing man made obstacles
28
 and legal obstacles
29
, but 
there are no published opinions discussing an obstacle created resulting 
from action by neither man nor the State. Natural acts, such as flooding and 
hurricanes, have not been examined as an obstacle preventing the exercise 
of a mineral servitude right. Courts have addressed such an obstacle in non-
binding dicta, providing support for the argument that either the courts or 
the legislature should expressly provide that natural disasters preventing the 
use of a mineral servitude should fall under the umbrella of an “obstacle” 
for purposes of suspending prescription of nonuse.
30
  
A. Under Louisiana Law, a Landowner’s Grant of a Future Right to Use 
the Land does not Impair a Mineral Servitude Owner from Using the Land 
in the Present  
In Gayoso Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., the Louisiana Supreme 
Court held that the landowner’s grant of a future mineral lease that was to 
take effect after the expiration of the outstanding mineral servitude did not 
suspend prescription because it was not an obstacle to the use of the right to 
explore the land for minerals.
31
 The Court noted that nothing stopped the 
mineral servitude holder from exercising his right to explore the land.
32
 
Furthermore, the Court opined that if the landowner had resisted his act to 
enter the land and exploit the resources, then this “might be said that the 
resistance constituted an obstacle, placed in the way of using the servitude, 
with the resultant effect of suspending prescription, until removed.”
33
  
B. Louisiana Courts Have Consistently Held That No Obstacle Occurs 
Where the Mineral Servitude Owner Has a Right to Explore the Land but 
Did Not Exercise It Because Of a Controversy in Court.  
Two decades after Gayoso, the Louisiana Supreme Court was tasked 
with addressing another ten years nonuse claim and the accompanying 
defense that the running of prescription was suspended due to an obstacle 
restricting the exercise of the servitude.
34
 The Court found that a lawsuit 
                                                                                                             
 28. See e.g., Hall v. Dixon 401 So.2d 473 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987). 
 29. See e.g., Gayoso Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333 (1933); see also 
Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044 (La. 1955). 
 30. See e.g., Hall v. Dixon, 401 So.2d 473, 476-77 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987). 
 31. Gayoso, 176 La. at 333, 340. 
 32. Id. at 341.  
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044, 1049 (La. 1955). 
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over ownership of the mineral rights was not a sufficient obstacle to 
suspend prescription because at no time was the mineral servitude owner 
denied entry onto the land, and the mineral servitude owner actually had 
free access to the land for exploration purposes.
35
 
The holding in Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co. reinforces the 
principle that if the mineral servitude owner has legal access to the land and 
is permitted and capable of exploring the land, then no obstacle is present 
even though there is pending questions over the ownership over these 
rights. However, the disputed mineral servitude owner whom is currently 
exercising its perceived right to explore will be permitted to use the land, 
but damages may result for trespass should the court determine that the 
party is not the lawful owner of the right to explore.  
C. A Government Order That Restricts the Right of Mineral Servitude 
Owner from Exercising His Right to Explore for Minerals, While Seemingly 
an Obstacle, Has Been Legislatively Declared to Not Suspend Prescription 
of Nonuse 
In Boddie v. Drewett, defendants alleged that their mineral servitude was 
not subject to prescription for nonuse because there was a compulsory 
unitization order
36 
from the Commissioner of Conservation that prohibited 
them from drilling on said land.
37 
It was argued that the government’s 
restriction on the mineral servitude owner’s ability to act was an obstacle 
that should suspend prescription from running. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court noted that the jurisprudence in mineral servitude cases typically leads 
to the conclusion that an obstacle was not in existence but “when the facts 
exhibit a real obstacle to the use of the servitude, such as the lawful orders 
of the Commissioner of Conservation, the Codal provision applies and the 
running of prescription is suspended by operation of law.”
38
 Accordingly, 
the court found that the order by the Commission of Conservation was an 
effective obstacle to the use of the mineral servitude because it effectively 
prohibited any drilling operations on the 12-acre tract.
39
 However, this 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. at 1056. 
 36. A compulsory unitization order is a formal exercise “of the state police power to 
compel owners of mineral interests, working interests and royalty interests to consolidate 
their separately owned estates over all, or a portion of, a common source of supply.” See 
Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization with an Emphasis on the Statutory 
and Common Law of the Eastern United States, 27 Energy & Min. L. Inst. Ch. 7 (2007). 
 37. 229 La. 1017, 1020 (1956). 
 38. Id. at 1024. 
 39. Id. at 1025. 
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decision was overruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court nearly a decade 
later, and the Mire decision is retained under Article 61, which provides 




D. A Physical Act by The Surface Owner, Which Prevents the Owner of the 
Mineral Rights from Exercising His Right to Explore the Land and Cannot 
Be Removed by Lawful Means, is an Obstacle Suspending the Running of 
Prescription of Nonuse  
The Louisiana Second Circuit for the Court of Appeal faced a 
controversy involving a physical restriction that was an alleged obstacle in 
the way of use of a mineral servitude.
41
 In Hall, a property owner who 
claimed partial ownership of the land subject to Plaintiff’s mineral 
servitude, engaged in several acts that caused the court to determine if the 
prescription was suspended.
42
 He pulled up the stake marking the site of the 
proposed well, locked the gate which controlled access to the proposed well 
site, and refused to permit the mineral servitude holder’s contractor to enter 
the land to do work preparatory to the drilling.
43
 The court concluded that 
the obstructions could not have been removed by any legal way other than 
by the suit which they instituted, holding that the property owner had 
effectively created an obstacle to the use of plaintiffs’ servitudes.
44
 The 
court further noted “that an obstacle may exist wholly apart from the 
actions of the surface owners.
45
 A notable scholar has briefly discussed that 
this could lead to a reasonable inference that flooding would constitute an 
obstacle to the exercise of a servitude.
46
 
Likewise, in Corley v. Craft, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, by overt 
act, created an obstacle within the meaning of Article 59.
47
 The plaintiffs 
were Mrs. Corley and Twin City Gas Company, the mineral servitude 
owner-lessor and mineral lessee, respectively.
48
 Plaintiffs sought to explore 
land under their contractual rights reserved in a sale to Defendant, but their 
                                                                                                             
 40. Mire v. Hawkins, 249 La. 278 (1966); La. R.S. 31:61 (2000). 
 41. Hall v. Dixon, 401 So.2d 473 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987). 
 42. Id. at 475. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 476. 
 45. Id. at 476-477; Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. 
REV. 1097, 1163 (1987). 
 46. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 
1163 (1987). 
 47. 501 So.2d 1049, 1050 (La. 1987). 
 48. Id. 
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efforts were hindered by Defendant’s acts.
49
 Notably, Defendant “dug out” 
the access road upon notice that drilling operations were to begin and 
refused Plaintiff’s offer to pay for road reconstruction.
50
 Defendant then 
contacted the party contracted to construct the new road and requested that 
he not assist Plaintiff, and then blocked access to the new access road with 
a sizeable bulldozer and backhoe.
51
 
Upon arriving at the blocked access road, Defendant refused to remove 
the obstruction, claiming that the plaintiffs needed to get a permit from the 
Commissioner for Conservation for the State of Louisiana. Plaintiffs agreed 
to the terms, flew down to the Commissioner’s office in Baton Rouge, and 
obtained a drilling permit. However, to their shock and horror, the access 
road remained blocked, and Defendant’s lawyer delivered a letter disclosing 
“that access was being denied because operations at the permitted location 
might be in violation of the laws of Louisiana  
and the regulations of the Department of Environmental Quality.”
52
 
Defendant then called DEQ directly to inform them he had been dumping 
his trash on the property, and thereupon DEQ issued an injunctive order 
against Plaintiff.
53
 In response, Plaintiff left the property, and Defendant 
subsequently removed its heavy equipment blocking the access road.
54
 
The acts of Defendant amounted to a “wild goose chase” and were 
designed to delay the exploration of the land with the hope that the 
underlying mineral servitude would terminate as a result of prescription of 
nonuse and would, as a result, revert to the defendant-landowner. 
Ultimately, the court determined that the continuous chain of events that 
prevented the plaintiff from exploring the land was within the meaning of 
an obstacle under Article 59.
55
 In doing so, the court found that defendant 
effectively established an obstacle to the use of the land by refusing to grant 
a pipeline right-of-way, removing the only access road to the property, 
blocking the entranceway to the drilling rig, requiring that the plaintiffs fly 
to Baton Rouge to obtain a newly signed drilling permit, and reporting his 
actions to the Department of Environmental Quality to obtain an injunction 
on drilling on the land.
56
 Furthermore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1053.  
 56. Id. at 1052.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
614 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 6 
  
 
“could not have removed or prevented this continuous series of obstacles 
created by the cutting of the only access, the blockage by the heavy 
machinery, and the attainment of the injunction order.”
57
 
III. Proposed Universal Standard for Determining Obstacles Within the 
Parameters of Article 59  
To clarify the question regarding what is an obstacle under the 
parameters of Article 59, broad, but certain standards must be enacted to 
assist persons in understanding what constitutes an obstacle under the law. 
A standard is proposed to determine whether a particular claim is sufficient 
to rise to the level of an obstacle and, thus, suspends the tolling of 
prescription of nonuse under Article 59.  
The four-prong test proceeds as follows:  
(1) Do(es) the mineral servitude owner(s) have a right to explore 
the land?  
(2) If yes, was the mineral servitude owner, or a person 
authorized to act on his behalf, by physical act, impermissibly 
restricted access to the land and his right to explore the land, or 
did an obstacle exist wholly apart from the actions of another 
person?  
(3) If yes, could the mineral servitude owner(s) reasonably 
resolve the obstruction?  
(4) If no, then an obstacle to the exercise of the mineral servitude 
existed and the tolling of prescription of nonuse is suspended 
until the obstacle can be removed from the land.  
A. The Party Seeking to Suspend the Tolling of Prescription of Nonuse Must 
Have a Legal Right to Explore the Land  
Article 59 establishes an initial threshold that a claimant must surpass 
before considering whether a particular act or event is an obstacle. Under 
Article 59, the party seeking suspension of the prescription of nonuse must 
have a legal right to explore the land. Additionally, under Article 59, 
suspension of prescription of nonuse is only applicable where the act or 
event qualifying as an obstacle relates to a mineral servitude.
58
 Suspension 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. 
 58. See La. R.S. 31:59 (2000).  
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of prescription of nonuse may apply to other mineral rights
59
, but the 
application under Article 59 is primarily pertinent to mineral servitudes. 
Implicit in the designation as a mineral servitude owner is the right to 
explore and produce the land’s minerals.
60
  
Each controversy examined relates directly, at its conception, to whether 
the claimant has a right to explore the land at issue. One of the clearest 
examples of a successful claim that an act was an obstacle sufficient to 
suspend prescription of nonuse was the landowner’s physical act to refuse 
entry to the land by the party bringing the claim before the court in Hall v. 
Dixon.
61
 The fact that plaintiffs were the owners of mineral servitudes on 
the land was undisputed.
62
 The plaintiffs sought “to enforce their rights as 
co-owners to explore for and produce minerals” for the land at issue.
63
 As 
such, the initial threshold was surpassed in Hall. Likewise, in each other 
case where a dispute arose around whether the claim was an obstacle under 
Article 59, it was clear that the party bringing the claim for redress was the 
owner of the right to explore upon the land at the time contested.
64
 
It is unambiguous from the jurisprudence that the right to explore the 
underlying minerals from the land is the initial threshold for determining 
whether an obstacle can suspend the running of prescription of nonuse. If 
the right to explore the land to reduce its minerals to possession exists, then 
prescription of nonuse may be suspended by an act or event falling within 
the confines of Article 59.  
                                                                                                             
 59. While the prescription of nonuse under Article 59 relates specifically to the Mineral 
Servitude, the statutory provisions for Executive Rights and Mineral Royalties infer that the 
same standard proposed for an “obstacle” would be applicable to these Mineral Rights. See 
e.g., La. R.S. 31:107 (2000) (permitting suspension of prescription of nonuse relating to the 
Executive Right); see also e.g., La. R.S. 31:98 (2000) (permitting suspension of prescription 
of nonuse relating to the Mineral Royalty). 
 60. La. R.S. 31:21 (2000). 
 61. See Hall v. Dixon, 401 So.2d 473 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1981). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 474. 
 64. See e.g., Corley v. Craft, 501 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1987) (It was 
undisputed on appeal that Mrs. Corley was the underlying mineral servitude owner, having 
reserved the right to explore from the land in a contract of sale to Mr. Craft); see also e.g., 
Central Pines Land Co. v. U.S., 274 F. 3d 881 (5th Cir. 2001) (“In 1929 Gulf Lumber 
Company conveyed to S.H. Fullerton mineral rights . . . [that] created a mineral servitude 
which was eventually transferred to Wm. T. Burton Industries (Burton)” and those rights 
were later transferred to Plaintiff, Central Pines Land Co., currently claiming that an obstacle 
existed that suspended prescription of nonuse.).  
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B. An Obstacle May Arise Because the Surface Owner Impermissibly 
Restricted the Mineral Servitude Owner(S) Right to Explore the Land or an 
Obstacle May Exist Wholly Apart From the Actions of the Surface Owner  
Two preeminent examples of a clear man-made obstacle to the exercise 
of the right to explore from the land are the circumstances in Corley and 
Hall.
65
 The most prevalent example of a surface owner impermissibly 
restricting the mineral servitude owner’s right to explore the land by his 
physical doing was in Hall v. Dixon. The partial property owner pulled up 
the stake marking the site of the proposed well, locked the gate which 
controlled access to the proposed well site, and refused to permit the 
mineral servitude owner’s contractor to enter the land to prepare for drilling 
operations.
66
 The court found that the property owner had effectively 
created an obstacle to the use of the mineral servitude.
67
  
Similarly, in Corley, the court determined that the continuous chain of 
events directly attributable to the landowner-defendant was an obstacle.
68
 
An obstacle was established because the landowner refused to grant a 
pipeline right-of-way to the mineral servitude owner, removed the only 
access road to the property, blocked the entranceway to the drilling rig, 
required that the plaintiffs fly to Baton Rouge to obtain a newly signed 
drilling permit, and reported his illicit actions on the land to the Department 
of Environmental Quality (the “DEQ”) to obtain an injunction on drilling 
on the land.
69
 It is thus clear that a physical act by a natural person that 
impedes the mineral servitude owner’s ability to reasonably access the land 
to explore thereon is an obstacle under Article 59.  
However, the court in Hall opined “that an obstacle may exist wholly 
apart from the actions of the surface owners.
70
 This reasonably infers that 
an obstacle can occur independently of the actions of a natural or juridical 
person. It has been theorized, without any substantial argument in support 
of the said theory, that flooding could establish an obstacle to the exercise 
of a servitude.
71
 It follows from dicta in Hall and scholarship just 
mentioned, as well as industry practice, that catastrophic flooding is an 
                                                                                                             
 65. Corley, 501 So.2d at 1049; Hall, 401 So.2d at 473. 
 66. Hall, 401 So.2d at 473. 
 67. Id. at 476. 
 68. Corley, 501 So.2d at 1053. 
 69. Id. at 1052. 
 70. Hall, 401 So. 2d at 476-477; Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 
61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1163 (1987). 
 71. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 
1163 (1987). 
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Safety concerns for the crew responsible for the drilling of the well, as 
well as for those citizens neighboring the property wherein the well sits, 
strengthen the position that an obstacle to its use exists during inclement 
weather by way of customary practices as well as the effect of government 
regulation. FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program guidance notably 
provides that an operator of a drilling site located in a floodplain should 
always have an emergency action plan if an “imminent flood event” should 
occur.
73 
This plan should set out how the operator will evacuate all vehicles 
and movable equipment out of the area in the event of a flood.
74
Anadarko, a 
market leader, takes advanced action in the face of imminent flooding.
75
 
During the 2013 flooding, Anadarko disclosed that it had” “shut in about 
670 of its 5,800 wells and about 20 miles of its more than 3,200-mile 
pipeline” in Colorado.
76
 Failure to take such advance action may lead to a 
scenario where flooding causes oil to be flushed out of wells and into 
neighboring waterways. For example, the “recent Texas floods have 




The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean 
Water Act (the “CWA”), as amended, is designed “to restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's surface 
waters.”
78
 The primary federal policy enumerated by the CWA is the 
prevention of “discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the 
                                                                                                             
 72. While this Comment primarily focuses on the application of the proposed standard 
to a catastrophic flooding event, the author finds a reasonable basis to conclude that other 
naturally occurring force majeure events (e.g., hurricanes or tropical storms) may rise to the 
level of an obstacle depending on the event’s impact on a particular mineral servitude and 
the land accompanying said mineral right. 
 73. Interim Technical Guidance on Drilling Oil and Gas Wells in Special Flood Hazard 
Areas (SFHA), FEMA NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, https://agriculture. 
ks.gov/docs/default-source/floodplain-assorted-publications/interim-fema-oil-gas-
guidance.pdf?sfvrsn=cb5bf5e4_2.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Renee Lewis, Flooding Oil and Gas Wells Spark Fears of Contamination in 
Colorado, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 18, 2013) http://america.aljazeera.com/ 
articles/2013/9/15/report-rupturedpipelinegasleaksoilspillsincoloradofloods.html. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Flooding Flushes Oil, Fracking Chemicals Into Rivers, STATESMAN (Sept. 3, 
2016) https://www.statesman.com/news/20160903/flooding-flushes-oil-fracking-chemicals-
into-texas-rivers.  
 78. Federal Water Pollution Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §1251 (2018).  
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navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon 
the waters of the contiguous zone . . . .” Penalties for violating the CWA 
prohibition on water pollution include Class I penalties, which include fines 
of $10,000.00 per violation, with a total cap of $25,000.00, as well as Class 
II penalties that may not exceed $10,000.00 per day and are capped at 
$125,000.00.
79
 Moreover, acts of gross negligence or willful misconduct 
can subject the party to an additional civil penalty of not less than 




Additionally, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (the “OPA”) projects liability 
onto a responsible party for an oil spill.
81
 The responsible party may be 
liable for removal costs and significant damages.
8280
 However, the OPA 
grants liability limits to responsible parties not found to have engaged in 
gross negligence or willful misconduct for damage.
83
 An offshore facility is 
capped at $75 million and, both an Onshore Facility and a Deepwater Port 
are capped at $350 million for damages from an oil spill.
84
 While the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund may provide some relief for removal costs, the 
potentially steep penalty existing for damages related to a spill has and will 
continue to serve as a significant deterrent to oil and gas operators in the 
event of inclement weather.
85
  
Accordingly, the laws of the United States, as well as regulatory 
guidance enacted under federal statutes, significantly deter an oil and gas 
operator from exploring during catastrophic flooding. The statutory and 
regulatory schemes focus on calculable penalties but do not begin to discuss 
reputational costs arising as a result of contamination of the water used by 
the nearby human populations. These reputational costs could irreversibly 
devastate a company’s bottom line. The risk and fear of substantial 
damages, as well as the safety of the operator’s crew and equipment, 
establish industry practice that oil and gas activities should halt during 
flooding that touches the land at issue. As a result, a reasonably prudent 
operator would not exercise its right to explore, so an obstacle exists in the 
same manner as if a natural person had physically restricted access to the 
land. These factors support the theory elucidated by a notable scholar that 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2018). 
 82. Id. § 2702. (2018). 
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C. The Mineral Servitude Owner Must Be Incapable of Reasonably 
Resolving the Obstruction 
It is universally accepted that the mineral servitude owner must be 
without any legal means to remedy the obstacle that prevents them from 
exploring the land to reduce its minerals to possession. This situation 
applies primarily to circumstances where a physical obstruction to use is 
present, such as the landowner effectively blocking the access to, or the 
actual use of, the land at issue. As in Corley and Hall, the plaintiffs “could 
not have removed or prevented this continuous series of obstacles”
87
 by any 
legal way other than by the suit which they instituted.
88
 
A reasonableness standard can be inferred from the jurisprudence and 
statutory provisions relating to the requirement that the party seeking relief 
must be incapable of remedying the obstacle. As such, the mineral servitude 
owner must have acted as a reasonably prudent mineral servitude owner 
would have under similar circumstances. This derives from the standard for 
a co-owner of a mineral servitude with its other co-owner,
89
 as well as a 
mineral lessee in its relation to a mineral lessor.
90
 Therefore, if the plaintiff 
has confirmed that they owned the right to explore the land and an obstacle 
within the scope of Article 59 existed, then they must have been incapable 
of resolving the obstacle by legal means that a reasonably prudent mineral 
servitude owner would have conducted.  
A traditional obstacle dilemma involves an obstacle created by a person 
(generally the landowner or their agent), as opposed to a natural event. This 
circumstance puts the agitator in a poor position to argue that the mineral 
                                                                                                             
 86. See Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV.1097, 
1163 (1987). 
 87. Corley v. Craft, 501 So.2d 1049, 1052 (La. 1987). 
 88. See id.; see also Hall v. Dixon 401 So.2d 473, 476 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987). 
 89. La. R.S. 31:176 (2000) (The provision notes that “[a] co-owner . . . must act at all 
times in good faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral servitude owner whose interest is 
not subject to co-ownership.” However, there is ambiguity whether the co-owner can 
stipulate what conduct is contained in this reasonableness standard. As Louisiana Mineral 
Code Article 122 explicitly provides for a right to stipulate on the reasonableness standard, 
this provision does not do so.) 
 90. La. R.S. 31:122 (2000) (“A mineral lessee . . . is bound to perform the contract in 
good faith and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator 
for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute 
reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.”).  
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servitude owner should not have waited until the last minute to drill because 
the landowner’s conduct was likely unforeseeable. However, an obstacle 
created by a natural, potentially foreseeable event raises a question 
regarding the applicability of a duty to preemptively mitigate foreseeable 
events caused by weather.  
In the event that a mineral servitude owner waits until the last minute to 
drill, the operator may be incapable of raising an obstacle defense because a 
reasonably prudent operator may be subject to an implied duty to take 
advance steps to mitigate against foreseeable threats.
91
 A reasonable 
attempt to resolve the obstruction preemptively may be an implied duty if 
flooding is anticipated to occur in the future.
92
 However, this claim has not 
been addressed by either the judiciary or legislature in Louisiana in the 
context of an obstacle affecting the exercise of a Mineral Servitude.  
Foreseeability is a prevalent topic in the ambit of tort law but could have 
application in this setting.
93
 The Supreme Court of the United States has 
proclaimed that floods are not foreseeable in the context of a force majeure 
clause.
94
 However, not every flood would be an excuse for delays, such as 
when the obstacles were anticipated by a contractor in his estimate of time 
and cost.
95
 If an obstacle is foreseeable based on scientific data touching the 
particular area at issue, then it is an open argument on whether the force 
majeure doctrine should be extended to the mineral rights owner to impose 
a mandate to prepare land for a natural event.
96
 To mitigate this uncertainty, 
the landowner, seeking to protect itself from loss, would effectively be 
under a duty to take preemptive steps to mold the property in preparation of 
foreseeable inclement weather. But, a duty to take preemptive steps should 
never be imposed in the event of unforeseeable weather that restricts the 
ability to explore the land.  
The ecologically rich Louisiana wetlands have been privy to thousands 
of exploration and development wells dating back to 1937.
97
 Drilling in the 
                                                                                                             
 91. See id. 
 92. This paper does not set out to establish whether a particular duty to preemptively act 
exists in the context of an Article 59 obstruction claim, but instead raises the possibility that 
it may exist. 
 93. See W J. Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C.L. REV. 921 (2005). 
 94. United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120 (1943). 
 95. See id.  
 96. FEMA’s flood maps could provide the appropriate scientific data to put an operator 
on notice that preemptive steps should be taken to address a flood-prone tract of land. See 
FEMA Flood Map Service Center, https://msc.fema.gov/portal/home.  
 97. Donald W. Davis and John L. Place, The Oil and Gas Industry of Coastal Louisiana 
and its Effect on Land Use and Socioeconomic Patterns, United States Department of the 
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Louisiana wetlands has recently become extremely controversial, with local 
governments seeking redress from energy companies under the theory that 
drilling has significantly damaged the wetlands, making the neighboring 
land more prone to storm damage.
98
 Besides the controversy, drilling in and 
around the Louisiana wetlands provides a quintessential example of why a 
duty to mitigate foreseeable flooding should be imposed on operators 
seeking the protection of Article 59.  
Floodplain wetlands are naturally designed to store flood waters during 
high runoff events.
99
 Louisiana wetlands are primarily privately-owned, 
making it very economic to explore for minerals.
100
 The wetlands are 
entirely within the lowest-lying area of the State, making it immensely 
flood prone.
101
 Moreover, the Louisiana coastline is often threatened by 
winter storms and hurricanes, which bring with them the indomitable force 
of storm surge.
102
 Thus, it is extremely predictable that land in or near the 
marshlands of Louisiana will face impact by flood waters that cause 
operators to temporarily suspend their actions until the water subsides.
103
 
                                                                                                             
Interior Geological Survey, https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1983/0118/report.pdf (“Onshore, more 
than 6,300 exploratory wells and more than 21,000 development wells were drilled in 
Louisiana*s eight southernmost parishes between 1937 and 1977. Nearly all those wells 
were in wetlands or inland water bodies.”). 
 98. Chris Kardish, Southern Louisiana Picks a Fight with Big Oil to Save the Wetlands, 
GOVERNING (Aug. 25, 2015) https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-
infrastructure/gov-louisiana-wetlands-lawsuits.html; Mark Schleifstein, New Orleans Files 
Wetland Damage Suit Against Oil, Gas Companies, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr.1, 2019, 
https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article_601e0eaf-c33b-53c1-8872-
6887c3c5cd90.html. 
 99. Agency of Natural Resources Department of Environmental Conservation, Wetland 
Functions and Values: Water Storage for Flood Water and Storm Runoff | Department of 
Environmental Conservation. https://dec.vermont.gov/watershed/wetlands/functions/storage 
[Accessed 4 Dec. 2019].  
 100. Sara Sneath, As Louisiana’s Coast Washes Away, State Cashing in on Disputed Oil 
and Gas Rights, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (May 31, 2018) https://www.nola.com/news/ 
environment/article_9894c6d7-794c-5ef6-a21e 120ff729527c.html.  
 101. John J. Kosovich, State of Louisiana—Highlight Low-Lying Area Derived from 
USGS Digital Elevation Data, Nov. 2008, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
available at https://pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3049 
 102. Edward Richards, Why the Master Plan Will Not Protect Louisiana and What We 
Should Do Instead, LSU LAW CENTER: CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY 
PROJECT, (February 21, 2017) https://sites.law.lsu.edu/coast/2017/02/why the-master-plan-
will-not-protect-the-coast-and-what-we-should-do-instead/. 
 103. David E. Dismukes and Siddhartha Narra, Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Inundation: 
A Case Study of the Gulf Coast Energy Infrastructure, Natural Resources, 9, 150-174, 
https://doi.org/10.4236/nr.2018.94010. (“Many coastal communities have to deal with more 
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As such, this component of the land must be factored into the calculus of 
drilling operations and an operator should have a duty to take reasonable 
steps to mitigate the force of the foreseeable flooding. Absent these 
proactive steps being taken, a mineral servitude owner should be prevented 
from claiming that inundation of their land established an obstacle to its 
use.  
Similarly, operations occurring within a 10, 25, 50, or 100-year flood 
zone may also be subject to the proposed implied duty to preemptively 
mitigate foreseeable events. A 100-year flood zone generally has a 1% 
annual chance of flooding.
104
 A 10-year flood zone has a 10% yearly 
chance of flooding, while 25 and 50-year flood zones have a 4% and 2% 
annual chance of flooding, respectively.
105
 These areas are coined “High 
Risk Areas” by FEMA.
106
 Over ten years, a mineral servitude owner must 
“use” the property. Respectively, there is a vastly increased risk of flooding 
occurring within these particular flood zones. Respectively, the risk of 
flooding over a ten years rises to 65%, 34%, 18%, and 10%.
107
 At a 
minimum, an operator within a 10 and 25- year flood zone seeking the 
protection of Article 59 should be under a duty to take preemptive steps to 
mitigate, as the risk is foreseeable.
108
 While not as persuasive, an operator 
under a 50 and 100-year flood zone should likewise be subject to the 
requirement of taking advance preparatory steps.
109
 
In sum, when the mineral servitude owner has a legal right to explore the 
land,
110
 is restricted from exploration due to the actions of the landowner(s) 
or some other event,
111
 and is subsequently incapable of reasonably curing 
that restriction, then an obstacle to the exercise of the mineral servitude 
                                                                                                             
frequent and extended flooding in the next few decades even before the rising sea levels lead 
to greater inundation extent.”).  
 104. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Definitions of FEMA Flood Zone 
Designations, available at https://efotg.sc.egov.usda.gov/references/public/NM/FEMA_ 
FLD_HAZ_guide.pdf.  
 105. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Unit 3: NFIP Flood Studies and Maps 
(2015), available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/floodplain/nfip_sg_unit_3.pdf. 
 106. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Definitions of FEMA Flood Zone 
Designations, available at https://efotg.sc.egov.usda.gov/references/public/NM/FEMA_ 
FLD_HAZ_guide.pdf. 
 107. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Unit 3: NFIP Flood Studies and Maps 
(2015), available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/floodplain/nfip_sg_unit_3.pdf. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See infra Part III.A. 
 111. See infra Part III.B. 
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exists, and the tolling of prescription of nonuse is suspended until the 
obstacle’s removal. 
IV. Application Of Standard Demonstrates Definitely That Catastrophic 
Flooding Is An Obstacle Sufficient To Suspend Prescription  
Absent a grant of judicial relief under to Article 59, Boudreaux’s failure 
to sufficiently exercise his mineral rights by January 1, 2019, would result 
in the termination of his mineral servitude and the subsequent reversion of 
the rights to the owner of the land—Thibodeaux. Thus, Thibodeaux would 
be entitled to the profits gained by Boudreaux during the time he 
improperly extracted minerals from Blackacre.
112
 
However, the proposed standard for determining whether particular 
actions or events are sufficient to rise to the level of an obstacle under the 
Louisiana Mineral Code grants a more equitable result than a strict 
application of the current ambiguous “standard” and opens the door for 
outside natural forces to represent an obstacle. When the mineral servitude 
owner, such as Boudreaux, has a legal right to explore the land,
113
 is 
restricted from exploring the land due to the actions of the landowner(s) or 
some other event,
114
 and is subsequently incapable of curing that restriction 
by reasonable and legal means, then an obstacle to the exercise of the 
mineral servitude exists, and the tolling of prescription of nonuse is 
suspended until the obstacle’s removal from the land.  
Boudreaux has a legal right to explore the land by way of the mineral 
servitude agreement executed between Boudreaux and Thibodeaux upon 
the sale of Blackacre to Thibodeaux and the concurrent reservation of the 
right to explore for minerals upon the land.
115
 The controversial analysis 
arises in the context of whether there was a natural, non-manmade obstacle 
and, if true, whether that obstacle was preventable by Boudreaux.  
Flooding constitutes an obstacle to the exercise of a mineral servitude.
116
 
Various federal laws and regulatory schemes support this position because 
the legislatures and administrative agencies significantly deter an oil and 
                                                                                                             
 112. See La. R.S. 31:12 (2000) (“Except as provided in Article 14, the owner of land may 
protect his rights in minerals against trespass, damage, and other wrongful acts of 
interference by all means available for the protection of ownership.”).  
 113. See infra Part III.A.  
 114. See infra Part III.B. 
 115. See infra Introduction. 
 116. See Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV.1097, 
1163 (1987). 
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gas operator exploration during catastrophic flooding.
117
 Also, reputational 
costs due to contamination of the water used by the nearby human 
populations could irreversibly devastate a company’s bottom line, so the 
operator is also deterred from acting under this clear rationale.
118
 
Additionally, the safety of the operator’s crew and equipment, in 
connection with other factors, establishes industry practice that oil and gas 
activities should halt during flooding that touches the land at issue.
119
 As a 
result, a reasonably prudent operator would not exercise its right to explore, 
so an obstacle exists in the same manner as if a natural person had 
physically restricted land access.
120
 
It follows that the running of prescription of nonuse on Blackacre was 
suspended during the time concerning the flood. Given that floodwaters are 
generally incapable of control, absent a substantial investment by 
government entities, Boudreaux is incapable of curing that restriction by 
reasonable and legal means. Accordingly, under the facts presented, 
prescription of nonuse would be suspended on January 29, 2009 and 
Boudreaux would have two additional days after the obstacle was removed 
from the land to interrupt prescription of nonuse by beginning good faith 
drilling. Since drilling was conducted to the depth where paying quantities 
are located within 2 days of the obstacle ceasing to be a barrier to 
operations, Boudreaux retains the right to explore for minerals on 
Blackacre. Alas, he is a millionaire, and Clotile is a happy wife.  
Mineral Rights Do Not Flood Away  
The civilian abrogation of the ad coelum doctrine, effectively eliminating 
the absolute ownership of land, has created a predicament warranting 
reparation. Mineral Servitude owners should rely on a concrete set of 
standards when determining whether a particular act or event is substantial 
enough to interrupt prescription of nonuse. The courts have been mostly 
silent on flooding and its effect on the right to explore for minerals. As 
flooding concerns continue to grow, the courts should adopt a set of 
standards to prevent immense controversy from arising between the mineral 
servitude owner and the landowner seeking to claim that the right to explore 
has terminated because of nonuse prescription. Under the proposed 
standard, the mineral servitude owner’s rights would not flood away. 
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